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ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES 
OF PRODUCT SAFETY REGULATION 
1. MODELS OF FEDERAL SAFETY REGULATION 
Christian Joerge,s has rccently attempted to harness the Europeanisation of regulatory poli-
cies to the discussion an the economic constitution of the EEC.1 He identifies three starting 
points in legal integration theory: neo-liberalism (Ordnungspolitik) as the foundation of the 
European economic constitution (Ernst Joachim Mwmaecker), the Community as a special 
purpose association (Zweckverband) of functional integration (Hans Peter lpsen) and legal 
structures and decision-making processes (Joseph H. H. Weiler) and couples them with 
Europeanisation options: from competitive democracy to competition between democra-
cies, regulatory centralism and finally eo-operative federalism. 
The description of the organisational structures is interwoven with the theoretical dis-
cussion and a set of regulatory options. lt is designed as a means to identify the paths 
which the Commission and the Community pursue in order to promote the Europeanisa-
tion of product safety policies. 
Many of the models of product safety regulation developed by the EEC may be identi· 
fied with the categories of regulatory centralism, more specifically eo-operative federalism. 
The EEC has placed a clear veto an competition between systems of regulation. With this 
statement, howcver, the limits of a clear policy are reached. The process of safety regula-
tion is characterised by an inventive richness an the part of the Commission, which always 
has as its goal the compatibility of social regulation with economic integration. Ta achieve 
this the EEC follows many tangled paths, which may only be reconstructed in the light of 
the history and peculiarities of each product. Thc following attempt to categorise the rela-
ted models can then be but a simplification. lt dcscribes the politics of the Community. 
The process continues and the legal structures remain to be settled. 
Markt ohne Staat ? Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Gemeinschaft und die Renaissance der regulativen 
Politik, forthcoming in WILDENMANN R. (ed), Staatswerdung Europas. Optionen einer europäischen 
Union, Baden-Baden 1991. 
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]. STANDARDISATION AND CERTIFICATION • EUROPEANISATION 
TiffiOUGII CENTRAIJSATION AND DECENTRAIJSATION 
Thc rcgulation of product safcty rcsts upon thc prcmisc that the State merely lays down 
fundamental safety requirements which are then elaborated by private standardisation 
organisations. The Commission has, in its New Approach,• based the Europeanisation of 
consumer goods safety upon the German model, i.e. legislative requirements are laid 
down by the EEC in directives related to products, the European standardisation organisa-
tions CEN/CENELEC particularise the details of these requirements and transform them 
into technical standards. The relationship between the Commission on the one hand and 
the standardisation organisations on the other, is regulated in the so-called "Memorandum 
of Agreement".• Central to this is a division of labour. CEN/CENELEC take on the elabo-
ration of standards, the EEC guarantees their financial status. The privatisation of product 
safcty, at the level of standard setting is legitimised by a democratisation of the procedural 
rulcs for the particularisation of standards. The standardisation organisations are open to 
pluralist participation, particularly on thc part of consumers.• 
Thc elaboration of standards is decentralised. CEN/CENELEC merely have a co-
ordinatory function, the real work is undertaken by national standardisation organisations. 
Input from interest groups such as industry, business and consumers occurs at the natio-
nal level. The pertinent technical committees co-ordinate the work of the national stan-
dardisation organisations and oversee agreement proccdures. In so far as consumer 
intcrest groups are financed by the EEC, are co-ordinated at and have direct input into 
the technical committees at Community level, thcy have an organisational advantage over 
industry.• At present they have an observer status on Community committees. 
The EEC has, howevcr, recently thrown this type of co-ordination model into doubt in 
its Green Paper on standardisation.• The EEC strives for a consistent Europeanisation of 
standardisation. lndustry should have a direct input into technical committees at the Com-
munity lcvel. The consequences of such a re-orientation arc far reaching. If industry is 
involved on the EEC levcl, then national standardisation loses its substance. National stan· 
dardisation organisations will become mere agents for the transformation of European 
standards into national laws. Iloth organisationally and institutionally the EEC has taken 
note of the experienccs of ETSI (European Telecommunications Institutions), responsible 
Council resolutio.~ of 7.5.1985, O.J. C 136/1 et seq. of 4.6.1985, cf. JOERGES C./FALKE J./MICK-
LITZ H.-W./ßRUGGEMEIER G„ Die Sicherheit von Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung der Europäi-
schen Gemeinschaft, ZERP Schriftenreihe Band 2, Baden-Baden 1988. 
Cf. DIN-Mitteilungen 64 (l 985), 1 et seq. 
MICKLITZ H.-W„ Produktsicherheit und technische Normung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft in 
PAETOW H.ffONNER K. (eds), Wirtschaftsregulierung in der Krise. Jahrbuch für Sozialökonomie 
und Gesellschaftstheorie, 1986, 109 et seq. 
The work is carried out in the "secretariat for co-ordination" attached to the consumer organisation 
ßEUC. 
Green Paper on the Development of European Standardisation: Action for faster tcchnological conver-
gcncc in Europe, COM (90) 456 final of 16.10.1990, 0.J. C 20/I et seq. of 28.1.1991. 
DROITCOMMUNAUTAIRE - 51 
for standardisation in this economic sector.7 Here Europeanisation has been realised. lt is 
foreseen that three standardisation organisations, CEN/CENELEC and ETSI will be com-
bined to form the "European Standardisation ßoard". The counterpart of the European 
Standardisation ßoard is the "European Standardisation Committee", which comprises 
industry, consumers, users, trade unions, the EEC Commission and the EITA Secreta-
riat. Although the particulars remain obscure - should the Council provide political advice 
in the sense of the "French superior standardisation council" ,• should it organise technical 
inputs into standardisation, or do both - the Green Paper contains a strong tendency for 
the displacement of decentralised standardisation by a strongcr centrally organised stan-
dardisation. The Commission has promised that this will lead to an acceleration of standar-
disation and increased competitivcness in the European economy especially in the area of 
new technologies. 
Certification presents a completely different picture.• Hcre Europeanisation is not 
centralised, but on the contrary decentralised. Certification documcnts the conformity of 
thc product to essential safety requirements. Put another way, it shows that the producer 
has observed the minimum legal requirements, namely essential safety requirements. A 
single "conformity mark" should certify this accordance, the "CE-mark". In its New Ap-
proach the Commission recognises the necd for a Europeanisation of certification, but 
docs not adequately tackle the difficulties involved. This task was reserved for the so-
called "Global Concept" .10 The Commission faced two problems. On the one hand there is 
no common certification model in the Membcr States; it is organised partly privately, part-
ly by the States and partly semi-stately. This fact alone leads to great diversity. ßut far 
more problematic for the EEC is the lack of national structures upon which the EEC can 
base the process of Europeanisation. To concretise, there are no authorities for the testing 
of standards analagous to the national standardisation organisations. There are also no 
contractually guaranteed relationships between the State and the Standard testing authori-
ties." 
A Europeanisation strategy must perform on two fronts. On the one hand, promote a 
centralisation process in the Member States themselves, to give the Commission an inter-
Conformance testing and certification in information technology and telecommunication, CENELEC, 
Amsterdam IOS PRESS, 1990. 
Cf. MICKLITZ H.-W. in JOERGES C. et al. (FN 2), p. 85 et scq. 
Cf. BURFEIND H., Die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Produktregelungen und Produktzertittzierung im 
Europäischen Recht, ZERP DP 4/90; cf. for the function of certification within the regulation of pro-
duct safety, JOERGES C., Product Safety Law, Interna! Market Policy and the proposal for a Directive 
on General Product Safety, EU! working paper, EPU No. 90/3: more comprehensively MICKLITZ H.· 
W., Thc Global Conccpt on Certification, the New Approach and Consumer Protection, Bremen/ Flo· 
rencc October 1990. 
10 O.J. C 23113 et seq. of 8.9.1990; Commission communicalion of 15.6.1989, O.J. C 267/3 et seq. of 
19.10.1989. 
" Cf. The Fedcral Republic of Germany has a "State Contract" with DIN, Great Brilain a "Memorandum 
of Agreement" with the BSI and France has recently crcated a "Co-operation Arrangement" with 
AFNOR, cf. MICKLITZ H.-W., Perspectives on a European directive on the safety of technical consu-
mer goods, Common Market Law Review 1986, 617 et seq. A parallel development would require the 
Member States to take responsibility for ccrtification. 
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locutor in each nation.12 A tried and tested method is the accreditation of testing places. 
On the other hand, comparable foundations for the work of testing places must be laid. A 
degree of homogeneity in testing decisions can only then arise, where all testing places 
work with comparable standards. The Commission makes use of the strategy of the New 
Approach. lt wants to lay down new essential requirements - relating to the form of certifi-
cation (self-certification or certification by an independent third person); to the equipping 
and structure of testing places (here the apportionment of responsibility has yet to be set-
tled) and to the supervision of testing places - which may then be elaborated into harmoni-
sed technical Standards. To date, however, there is not an adequate common working 
framework to guarantee the Europeanisation process. Only a continuous exchange of expe-
rience between the testing systems will enable the testing organisations of the Member 
States to agree upon a common practice. The Commission has undertaken the task of or-
ganising this exchange of information and expertise between testing authorities. For this 
purpose it established the European Organisation for Testing and Certification (EOTC). 
For a transitional period the European standardisation organisations CEN/CENELEC will 
perform this function. Again co-operation is based upon a "Memorandum of Agree-
ment"." 
The policy of the "Global Concept" places a certain organisational pressure on natio-
nal testing authorities. To prepare for Europeanisation these systems must create national 
organisational structures. These authorities are in competition with the national standardi-
sation organisations. Coupling EOTC with CEN/CENELEC may thus prove troublesome. 
In this area, however, the lack of national and European representation in certification 
becomes apparent. A further centralisation may cause problems, it will in any case, be 
harder than in the sphere of standardisation. The centralisation foreseen by the Green 
Paper is designed to open up markets. In contrast to this testing structures for pharmaceu-
tical and chemical supervision have the role of State authorities. This function was traditio-
nally exercised decentrally in the areas of technical consumer goods and foodstuffs." The 
centralised supervision of technical consumer goods would therefore prove "conditio sine 
qua non" for the centralisation of testing structures at the national level. lt is possible that 
the standardisation of the work, when taken together with an accreditation system will 
stimulate such a process. 
12 German testing institutions, however, are getting together. They hJve set up a "Zentralstelle der Länder 
für Sicherheitstechnik". 
1
' Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission of the European Communities, the European 
Free Irade Association (EFTA) and CEN/CEl'iELEC for the Setting-up of the European Organisation 
for Testing and Certification. 
14 An organisational form bearing no relation to the prescnt governmental structures of the Member 
States. 
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2. THE MANAGEMENT OF "NORMAL" RISK IN PHARMACEUTICAL, CHEMICAL AND TECHNICAL 
CONSUMER GOODS - THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FUNCTJONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR 
AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND TIIE MEMBER STATES15 
Community policy aims to harmonise market entry conditions through secondary Commu-
nity law. lt aims to create common central conditions for the marketing of these categories 
of product. The enforcement of secondary Community law on the management of normal 
risk should, however, remain in the hands of the Member States. This division of labour 
between the Community and the Member States lcads to federalist enforcement in Euro-
pe." This federalist enforcement can only be diluted if Member States co-operate vertical-
ly with the Community and horizontally amongst themselves. The principle of a division of 
labour must therefore be enriched by the mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination. 11 
lt remains only to explain the meaning of the management of "normal" risk. Here we 
restrict ourselves to the thesis, that the management of "normal" risk legitimises State 
intervcntion in the market. lt relates to those risks which are inherent to the product and 
the maintenance of the minimum State controls necessary for the protection of the public. 
These risks cannot, however, be eliminated. 1• The category of normal risks gains 
importance when comparison is made with crisis management, which will be dealt with 
later.1• 
The policies of the Community have been realised to very different extents, even if 
their aim has remained constant. The Community has for many years striven to open the 
market. Common standards have been established for the marketing of chemicals;" simi-
larly for consumer goods, insofar as directives have been released under the New Ap-
proach,21 and for pharmaceuticals inasmuch as producers submit themselves to a multi-
state authorisation procedure should they wish to market pharmaceuticals in more than 
15 Cf. MAYNTZ R., Föderalismus und die Gesellschaft der Gegenwart, Archiv für Völkerrecht 1989, 232 
et seq. 
l• Cf. FROWEIN J. A„ Integration and the Federal Experience in Germany and Switzerland in CAPPEL-
LETTI M./SECCOMBE M./WEILER J. H. H. (eds), Integration through Law, Berlin/New York 1986, 
586, 587. 
11 Cf. LENAERTS K., Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, AJCL 1990, 205 et scq., 230 
has as its starting point: "The principle of federalist enforcement has found its way from German cons-
titutional law into the Community legal order". 
18 Literature on the nature of risk is comprehensive. A common examination of the form of risk in each 
product category does not, however, exist. In relation to this area JOERGES C. et al. (FN 2), 35 may 
suffice. The questions posed here may be applied to the supervision of pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs. 
19 Cf. p. 55 et seq. 
2° Council directive 79/831/EEC of 18.9.1979, 0.J. L 259/10 et scq. of 15.10.1979; to the present state 
of harmonisation REHBINDER E„ Harmonisierung des Chemikalienrechts - Harmonisierungswirkun-
gen der Richtlinie 79/831/EWG in den Mitgliedstaaten der Europl!ischen Gemeinschaften im Lichte des 
deutschen Rechts, Schriften der Gesellschaft für Rechtspolitik, Band 3 Chemikalienrecht, München 
1986, 79-139. 
21 FALKE J„ Normungspolitik der Europl!ischen Gemeinschaften zum Schutz von Verbraucher und Ar-
beitnehmer in ELLWEIN Th./HESSE J. J./MAYNTZ R.iSCHARPF F. W„ Jahrbuch zur Staats- und 
Verwaltungswissenschaft, Band 3, 1989, 217 et seq, gives an overview of the present state of Europea· 
nisation. 
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one Member State.22 An authorisation from one Member State does not yet guarantee the 
right to market in all other States. The authorisation of biotechnological pharmaceuticals 
provides the exception to the rule with a centralised authorisation procedure. 20 The Com-
mission wishes to extend the centralised procedure and is attempting to restrict the future 
application of national authorisation control mechanisms to pharmaceuticals.2• A common 
standard in the area of consumer goods will be set should the EEC enact lhe directive on 
product safety, currently being prepared.2• The directive would then cover in those areas 
not yet affected by product-related directives under the New Approach. lt remains to clari-
fy whether the directive Iays down common safety standards, i.e. not either it is to be ap-
plied only as a subsidiary instrument or can, at the very least, be used to supplement the 
directives in the light of the new programme.2• 
Whilst the principle of the division of labour is relatively far advanced the same can-
not be said for the principle of co-operation and co-ordination. lt is, however, precisely 
the two mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination which have the last word on whe-
ther the market remains open, more specifically whether it can be closed retrospectively. 
This is relevant as further decisions must oftcn be taken about risks once authorisation has 
bcen given. Standards laid down at the outset do not guarantee that those markets opened 
up will remain open. An examination of the distinction between pre- and post-market 
controls gives the following picture. The Community wishes to use the newly established 
agreement proccdures between the Member Statcs and the EEC, to guarantee the exist-
ence of common EEC standards - more precisely the conditions for market entry. This 
occurs through the creation of committees in which the representatives of the Member 
States supervise the Europeanisation of market entry conditions. Thus the committees in 
their functions and structures reflect the prcsent state of the harmonisation of marketing 
standards. 
The situation in the area of post-market control is far more complex. Federalist cnfor-
cement necessarily leads to divergence between the decisions of the Member Statcs. Co-
hesion can only be achieved through procedural inslruments. The Communily firsl 
attempted, with the help of communication and reporting duties to secure a minimum of 
22 Cf. to this more comprehensively, HART D.IREICH N., Integration und Regulierung des Arzneimittel-
marktes in der EG, ZERP Schriftenreihe Band 13, Baden-ßaden 1990; in brief: HANCHER L., Thc 
European Pharmaceutical Market: problems of partial harmonisation, Eurorean Law Review, 1990, 9 
et seq. 
23 Council directive 87/22/EEC of 22.12.1986, 0.J. L 15/40 et seq. of 17.1.1987; Council dircctivc 
90/220/EEC of 23.4.1990, O.J. L 117/15 et scq. of 8.5.1990 .• 
2• HART D.IREICH N. (FN 22), Pt. 26.a. 
25 Commission proposal of 11.6.1990, O.J. C 156/8 et seq. of 27.6.1990; to this JOERGES C. (FN 9); 
comprehensively HOFFMANN D. in FALLON M.IMANIET F. (eds), Product safety and control proccs-
ses in the European Community, ßrussels 1990, 63 et seq. 
26 lt is not yet clcar whether the planned directive lays down a common standard for all products, i.e. 
inclusive of thosc regulated in directives released under the New Approach, or whether it should only 
be applicd where regulatory lacunae arise. At the present it appears that the Commission is following a 
complcmentary programme, it remains unclear which practical consequcnces this will have; cf. FRIELE 
R„ Stellungnahme zur Richtlinie über Produktsicherheit, Stellungnahme für die Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
der Verbraucherverbände, Typescript, Bremen Autumn 1990. 
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eohesion in the supply of mutual information. This follows the style of international organi-
sations. The sovereignty of the Member States is not questioned. The eonstituent prineiple 
of a division of labour is safeguarded. lt was and remains the poliey of thc Community to 
aet as a eentral eo-ordinator and disseminator of information in order to minimise the risk 
that Europeanisation will fall vietim to intergovemmental eo-ordination. This poliey has 
met with protest on the part of the Member States, sinee it is supposed that the eentralisa-
tion of information leads to the eentralisation of deeision-making. 
Reeently the Commission has inereased its attempts to give eo-operation and eo-
ordination in the area of post-market eontrol a firm legal framework. The meehanisms are 
well known. The EEC attempts to find a eentralised interloeutor in eaeh Member State to 
eollate national information and pass it to the EEC. The eonstant use of this meehanism21 
has a legal baekground. The addressees of the EEC are the Member States, not merely 
the legislatures but also administrations and the eourts. The EEC, however, ean interaet 
only with the eentral instanee of the Member States. If, due to the federal strueture of a 
Mcmber State, there is no eentral instanee the Community must foster eentralisation to 
promote Europeanisation within the strueture foreseen by the Treaty. To a degree the 
Membcr States have created central national supervision agencies, espeeially in the areas 
of pharmaceuticals and biochemicals. lt is well known that this was not done solely with 
eonsumer protcction in mind, but also owes to the interests of industry in wishing to pro-
mote the legitimatc marketing of potentially dangerous goods on the basis of homogenous 
state deeision-making. Centralisation in the Member States facilitates the creation of Euro-
peanised post-market control. Such instances are lacking in the areas of consumer goods 
and foodstuffs. The Netherlands, with the Europeanisation process in mind, have introdu-
ced a eentralisation of these national organisations." The Federal Republie of Germany 
faces an operational difficulty. More eoncretely it is eoneemed that the national co-
ordination and endorsement procedure will bind the supervision authorities (Gewerbe-
aufsichtsämter) morc closely together. In reality a deccntrally organised enforcement of 
Community Standards strengthens the national instance and weakens thc regions (Länder). 
The EEC does not, however, bow to the pressure to create central national agencies. 
To an ever greater extent it pursues a policy of harmonisation of national enforcement 
instruments. In this economic perspective - post-market control. In the areas of pharma-
eeuticals,20 chemicals,s• consumer goods and foodstuffs," the Commission has preparcd 
27 Cf. Thc accreditation system of testing facilities, infra p. 65 et seq. 
28 Cf. GESTEL 1\1. C./SNIJDERS G. 1\1. F., Product Safcty in Emergcncy Situations. The Netherlan<ls, 
Country Report in the frame of the research project an the managemcnt of emcrgcncy situations in the 
Member States of the Europcan Community, conducted by ZERP for the Commission of the European 
Community under the direction of H.-W. Micklitz. 
29 EEC-Commission proposal Doc. IIl/3603/90-EN, February 1990, Future systems for the free move-
ment of medicinal products within the European Community (four prcliminary draft proposals): Draft 
explanatory memorandum; proposal for a Council regulation (EEC); proposals for three Council dirccti-
ves (EEC) amending directives 65/65/EEC, 75/318/EEC, 75/319/EEC, 81/851/EEC, 81/852/EEC, 
87/22/EEC, COM (90) 283 final-SYN 309 to 312 of 14.11.1990; O.J. C 330/l et scq. of 31.12.1990. 
Cf. HART D., Harmonisierung der Marktüberwachungsinstrumente für Arzneimittel in der EG, Pharm. 
lnd. 52, Nr. 9 (1990), 1072 et seq. 
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proposals which are directed at a harmonisation of the supervision provisions of the Mem-
ber States. The decision-making authority of the Member States is not infringed upon. 
Instead comparable ground rules are laid in the Member States. An exception to this is 
pharmaceuticals as the Commission feels that post-market control of biotechnological, high 
tech and new medicinal goods (all authorised centrally) should be fully Europeanised.» In 
this case a supranational authority would usurp national competences, the Member States 
would merely act as agents. 
lt is clear that a harmonisation of post-market controls, including the supervision of 
pharmaceuticals, does not adequately guard against the closure of markets due to the 
divergent decisions of the Member States. This can be traced to those provisions in secon-
dary Community law with a "general" nature. Thus even where instruments are identical, 
decisions taken may diverge. Therefore communication between national agencies and the 
Community is necessitated. The appropriate method of securing agreement is the creation 
of committees. A slight simplification allows a distinction to be made between "scientific-
technical committees" and "political-administrative committees". Scientific-technical com-
mittees are designed to promote consensus between experts on thc potential risks of a 
product. The composition of these committees is dictated by scientific ability. They thus 
include, in addition to the representatives of the Member States, indcpendent scientific 
experts." The political-administrative committees" do not merely advise on conditions of 
market entry but should also exert influence on post-market control. This mechanism has, 
in essence, an advisory nature and does not concretise post-market control.•• The new 
political-administrative committees are mostly overstretched by their new competenccs, as 
they were not designed to exercise them.;• They were created and have grown in the tradi-
30 Proposal for a Council regulation on the evaluation and the control of environmental risks of existing 
substances, COM (90) 227 final-SYN 276 of 5.10.1990; O.J. C 276/1 et seq. of 5.11.1990. 
" Cf. in relation to the proposed directive on general product safety, COM (90) 256 final - SYN 192 of 
11.6.1990, O.J. C 156/8 et seq. of 27.6.1990; to this MICKLITZ H.-W„ (ed), Post Market Control of 
Consumer Goods, ZERP-Schriftenreihe Band 11, Baden-Baden 1990, with comparative country reports 
from certain Member States of the EEC, Australia, Swedcn, the USA in addition to an analysis of the 
post-market control instruments of the proposed directive. 
" Cf. HART D. (FN 29). 
" Such committees exist for pharmaceuticals - the "Pharmaceutical Committee" • and for chemicals · the 
"Advisory Committee for Toxicity and Ecological Toxicity". There is no such committee for technical 
consumer goods. The Commission is considering the creation of a committee for product safety and has 
commissioned research from ZERP under the direction of FALKE 1. This study examines the Commit-
tec for Technical Appliances and its possible transposition to the Community level. H. Bentlage is a 
member of ZERP. A parallel study is underway in France under the direction of TEMPLE H„ at the 
Centre de Droit de la Consommation, U niversite de Montpellier. A first draft is now undcrway: Projet 
de dccision de Ja Commission relative a la creation d'un comite consultatif de la sccurite des produits et 
des services, SPC/DCC/l, 7.1.1991. 
" For pharmaceuticals the "Committee for Pharmaceutical Specialities", Council directive 87/19/EEC of 
22.12.1986, O.J. L 15/31 et seq. of 4.6.1985; for chemicals the commillee in Council directive 
791831/EEC of 18.9.1979, 0.J. L 259/10 of 15.10.1979, Art. 20; for technical consumer goods the 
Standing Committee for Standardisation undcr the information, Council directive 83/189/EEC of 
28.3.1983, O.J. L 109/8 et seq. of 26.4.1983. 
35 With the cxceplion of pharmaceuticals and emergency controls for consumer goods and foodstuffs. 
•• For pharmaceulicals, HART D./REICH N. (FN 22), scction l, I 2a (noles 7-11); for technical consu· 
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tion of the opening of markets. lt is possible that, even without explicit competences, these 
committees have created their own Europeanisation momentum. This was not, however, 
planned and linked to concrete procedures, but is a spontaneous evolution.37 
In relation to the federalist movement, the most decisive factor is the "centralisation" 
pressure which the organisation of post-market controls creates. Only the representatives 
of the central national authorities may sit on the political-administrative committees. 
3. MANAGEMENT IN TIIE CASE OF INCREASED RISK - CENTRALISATION TENDENCIES 
Community policy aims to increase the concentration of the management of product safety 
in its own hands. The Community, however, treads cautiously and pays due regard to the 
peculiaritics of each product category. This may explain the difficulty in identifying one 
common policy. The development is still underway and the EEC applies disparate models, 
best understood in relation to the overall concept, in order to use the peculiarities of each 
product as a vehicle for Europeanisation. 
The management of increased risk is, to a certain extent, suited to a centralisation of 
product safety policies in the hands of the Community. This in practice relates to the com-
bating of grave and immediate risk to consumers arising from technical consumer goods 
and the binding decisions, which the Commission should take.•• At present, research into 
management of crisis situations in the Member States is underway." 
In the area of pharmaceuticals, more specifically with the introduction of Europe-
wide rules for biotechnological products, the Commission has achieved a break-through in 
the Europeanisation of market entry conditions. The fact that risks arising from biotechno-
logical medicinal products arouse great public interest greatly aids the successful harmoni-
sation of standards. This holds true, even though the pharmaceutical industry accepted 
EEC supervision as industry goals could be better pursued at the EEC level. The Commu-
nity also strives for the centralisation of post-market control of biotechnological products. 
A specific example is provided by the regulation of "undesired side-effects". Doubts about 
a product must be communicated to the Commission and the Member States within 15 
days.•0 In contrast to consumer goods and foodstuffs, however, no special procedure is 
planned at the EEC level in order to accelerate Community-wide decision making. Res-
ponsibility for post-market control is dependant upon the type of authorisation procedure. 
If this is centralised, the Commission is ultimately responsible. If it remains decentralised, 
the Member States are competent."' 
mer goods, JOERGES C. et al. (FN 2), 389 et seq. 
" The consequences of this will bc dealt with infra p. 62 et seq. 
38 Art. 11 of the general product safety directive (FN 31). 
" The Management of Emergency Situations in the area of Consumer Goods in the Member States of the 
Community (FN 28). 
•• Art. 22 para. 1 of the draft directive, the unpublished version provided for a mere 48 hours! 
• 1 Cf. HART D. (FN 29) and HART D./REICH N. (FN 22), pt. 24 et seq. (26b). 
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The situation is different for chemicals. In its planned regulation, the Commission is 
primarily concerned with the problem of the so-called "old-burdens", i.e the circa 
100000 chemicals which were in circulation at the time of the enactment of the sixth 
amendment directive. The planned regulation does not aim to Europeanise decision-
making but to Europeanise the premises upon which decisions rest. The possible conse-
quences of a judgment on the dangers of each chemical should be seen in the light of 
directive 76/769/EEC.•2 This is the lowest level of Europeanisation as a decision on mar-
keting must be taken in accordance with Article 100." The planned regulation, however, 
represents an entry into the post-market supervision of chemicals. lt will be shown that the 
Commission uses exactly those mechanisms designed to lead to Europeanisation in the 
post-markct supervision of consumer goods and foodstuffs, as the basis for a decision on 
possible dangers. Clearly the "old-burdcns" do not present an "emergency situation", but 
rather a situation in which increased risk is subject to Community-wide evaluation. 
If one wishes to evaluate the degree of planned Europeanisation in each product cate-
gory, it is necessary to differentiate between the degree of delegation in each decision-
making process. The most far-reaching Europeanisation would entail the placing of deci-
sion making in the hands of an agency with regulatory competences. This approach is 
apparent in pharmaceutical law. The Commission is planning the creation of a "European 
Evaluation Authority for Pharmaceuticals" ." This will be responsible for the authorisation 
and supervision of all biotechnological medicines and for those medicines authorised 
under the multi-state procedures. lt should be composed of technical working groups, an 
administrative council (representatives of the Member States, the Commission and the 
Parliament) under the control of a director and served by an administrative and technical 
apparatus. The most important actor is the reconstituted "Pharmaceutical Committee". lt 
has the brief to co-ordinate action with the relevant national authorities in relation to the 
suspension or withdrawal of authorisation. The Commission and not the Pharmaceutical 
Committce, however, takes decisions. 
Europeanisation in the area of environmental protcction has progressed to the extent 
that the Membcr States have agreed to the creation of an Environmental Agency.•• The 
Environmental Agency, however, does not have a regulatory competence. lt is not even 
allowed to publicise its work, public exposure, as cxperience has shown, being the mecha-
nism most likely to forward a Europcan decision-making process in the area of "crisis 
control" in emergency situations.•• The agency should collate information and evaluate 
risks to the environment. This is the preparatory work forming the basis of decisions, 
which are then taken by the Community. Insofar, the Community is true to its policy of 
Europeanisation in the evaluation of environmental risk. The Environmental Agcncy is 
" Council directive 76/769/EEC of27.7.1976, 0.J. L 262/201 et ~q. of 27.9.1976. 
" lt is foreseeable that Art. 100 will be replaced by Art. lOOa. 
" Cf. FN 29. 
" O.J. L 120/I etseq. of ll.5.1990. 
•• As proof of this, the situation in France, where the "Commission de la securite des consommatcurs" has 
had great success with this type of regulatory instrument. Cf. MICKLITZ H.-W. in JOERGES C. et al. 
(FN 2), 72 et scq. 
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merely one other facet of the evaluation procedures for "old-burdcns". In short, thc 
political-administrative decisions remain in the hands of thc Membcr States. 
In contrast to the framework adopted for pharmaceuticals, the Europeanisation of the 
management of emergency situations in the spheres of consumer goods and foodstuffs is 
not based on the delegation of the decision-making process to a particular working group. 
The creation of a European Consumer Authority has neither been planned, nor discus-
sed. Management, even in crisis situations should be carried through with the aid of the 
Commission. 
If any similarity can be identified in all the planned models, it is the "two-tier" proce-
dure. The first tier encompasses the technical-scientific evaluation of risk, the second the 
political evaluation of the results of the first tier. The first stages arc couplcd with and 
interrelated to each other in many different ways. That the Member States can contribute 
their technical-scientific knowledge in the first stage is important for the management of 
risk situations. Thus, the first tier fills the technical-scientific gap at the base of the Com-
munity and dispenses with the need for large numbers of agencies as in the national-
European or American dimensions. Thus the Commission has attempted to restrict the 
initial numbers of the Pharmaceutical Authority to 100. This first stage procedure is, how-
evcr, Europeanised, insofar as the Member States are active in the name of the Communi-
ty as simple agents." 
In pharmaceutical law the reconstituted "Committee for Pharmaceutical Specialities" 
is expected to organise the technical endorsemcnt proccdurcs within the cnvisaged Euro-
pean Pharmaceutical Agency.•• The solution to the "old-burdens" of chemicals appears 
different insofar as the Commission wishes to make use of the principle of the "lead coun-
try", borrowed from international organisations. In the preparatory stage each country 
undertakes the evaluation of and work on particular chemical risks. If the "lead country" 
concludes that a Community-wide decision on further markcting should be taken, it turns 
to the Commission with the requisite ballot, which then activates the Management Commit-
tec. To date thcre is no advisory Committee for Product Safety in consumer goods and 
foodstuffs." The functional equivalcnt is an information and consultation procedure, which 
is preparatory to the decision taken in the Management Committce. The cxecution process 
is not detailed. The placing of this procedure in the hands of the Member States, however, 
guarantees that they can introduce the requisite technical knowledge to the process. Al-
though these "first stages" arc very diverse in strueture, they all serve the same purpose, 
the evaluation of the risk. 
Decision-making and endorsement are identieal for chemicals, tcchnical consumcr 
goods and foodstuffs. In the case of chemieals a simple decision on the existence of a risk 
41 The provisions in pharmaccutical law (FN 29) and in chcmical (p. 7 of the Council regulation, FN 30) 
explicitly make rcference to "in the name of the Community". The general product safety dircclive (FN 
31) is formulatcd as follows: "The Commission may decide to initiale a consultation and investigation 
procedure with the Member States" (Art. 9). 
•• Cf. HART D. (FN 29). 
49 Cf. supra p. 56 FN 33. 
60 - HANS-W. MICKLITZ 
and the desirability of European regulation is made. Management Committee proceedings 
end with a request to the Commission to introduce marketing restrictions in accordance 
with directive 761769/EEC.•• On the other hand decisions on technical consumer goods 
and foodstuffs are concemed with the continued marketing of goods recognised to be dan-
gerous. lt follows the "Management Committee" variant of "comitology", i.e. in each Ma-
nagement Committee the national representatives gather to make a political decision upon 
the results of the first stage investigation. These committees provide the arena for a practi-
cal Europcanisation of national administrative law. In accordance with the Management 
Committee variant, the Commission enacts measures, which are directly applicable. 
Should voices be raised in protest against Commission measures (but not against the 
committee's findings), then the measures are notified to the Council. In this case the Com-
mission may - emphasis is placed on may - postpone the measures for five days in the case 
of consumer goods and foodstuffs and for one month in the case of chemicals. To make 
this clear: the Commission decides. The Council may, on the basis of a qualified majority 
and within the time limits, overturn the decision. This procedure arises directly from the 
structure of the committee, as the Member States are represented on it. 
The situation is different again for pharmaceuticals. The reconstituted Committee for 
Pharmaceutical Specialities is composed of technical expcrts. Votes are taken an the basis 
of a scientific technical understanding of the material. Should a Member State make a 
written protcst, the Commission must decide within 30 days. If such a protest is made the 
Commission may re-activate committee procecdings. lf the differences cannot be bridged, 
the Commission passes the matter to the "Standing Committee on Medicinal Products for 
Human Use" ." This is in principle a repcat of Management Committee processes. This 
committee, comprising representatives of the Commission and the Member States, must 
take a decision on the basis of a qualified majority.» If the Commission is in agreement 
with the vote it must enact the necessary measures. If the Commission withdraws, the 
Council must decide. The Commission can, however, only take provisional mcasures. An 
exceptional regulation for emergency situations "where action is urgently necessary to 
protect public health" arises insofar as the decision within the Committee for Pharmaccuti-
cal Specialities must be taken within 15 days.» 
lt is impossible to foresee whether the Member States will agree to the planned Euro-
peanisation of decision making. lt is possible that the Commission will apply the American 
model of "grants in aid" to purchase support. In reality the centralisation of the manage-
ment of increased risk leads to a tendential reduction in the power of national regulatory 
instances. The Member States can formally give validity to their influences on decision-
making in the Management Committces. lt remains to be seen, howevcr, how practice will 
evolve. The question is: will the mixture of EEC and national competences reduce the 
authority oflocal and regional instances? "The knives are drawn",. the call for a "Solan-
•• Cf. FN 42. 
" Cf. draft dircctive 90/C 330/01, Art.10.4. 
02 Council directive 87/19/EEC of 22.12.1986, 0.J. L 14131 et seq. of 17.1.1987. 
53 Draft directivc (FN 51), Art. l8 para. 3 and 18 para. 4. 
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ge III" is prepared.•• The problem is not, however, restricted to Germany. Spain also has 
powerful regions, which strongly defend their recently won competences from central State 
incursions.ss In addition all forms of centralised management of increased risk situations 
alienate the decision-making level from the problem to be addressed.•• This lack of 
connection can only be avoided through procedural "re-referals". The hands of the EEC 
are tied as they cannot include the regions or local instances in the management pro-
cess.07 
4. INTERGOVERNMENTAL OR INTERREGIONAL CO-OPERATION 
AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CENTRALlSATION 
An increasing tendency to intensify "horizontal co-operation" in the management of nor-
mal risk is justified by the theory that a centralisation of competences in the hands of the 
EEC increases room for operation at the local and regional level. The most recent example 
is the transposition of the British risk information system to the Netherlands. This system 
was set up in ßritain with the introduction of Standard Trading Offices under the Consu-
mer Product Safety Act and Safety at Work Act.•• lt creates a horizontal network of some 
126 offices, who continuously interact providing information on the appearance of risk, 
completed investigations and decisions taken. The local decision-making authority of Stan-
dard Trading Officers is prcserved. The Netherlands have mirrored this system with their 
"Keuringsdiensten" .•• lt is also clear that both countries wish to make use of these co-
operation arrangements. In practice a competition model could develop between the exi-
sting rapid exchange system•0 and the information network planned by the product safety 
directive. The users of this system claim it to be superior and more effective, since they 
have an on-line system which provides them with greater information. 
54 SCHOLZ R., Wie lange bis "Solange III"?, NJW 1990, 941, to this EVERLING U., ßrauchcn wir 
"Solange III" ? On the requests for a revision of the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, EuR 
1990, 195 et seq. 
„ Cf. in relation to consumer protection, which has led to constitutional confiicts in Spain, LOPEZ SAN-
CHEZ M. A., La tutela del Consummatore in Spagna, Rivista Trimestriale Di Diritto e Procedura Civi-
le 1986, 960 et seq.; GERLACH J. W., Die moderne Privatrechtsentwicklung in Spanien, ZVglRW 85 
(1986), 24 7 et scq. 
56 For pharmaceutical law, HART D. (FN 29), for consumer goods see, MICKLITZ H.-W. (FN 28), Ab-
schlussbericht Management von Notfallsituationen bei Konsumgütern. 
57 Cf. the füst programmes for the inclusion of the regions. Commission decision for the creation of a 
Council of regional and local bodies 88/487 /EEC of 6. 9.1988, 0.J L 24 7 /23 et seq. of 24.6.1988; 
also PERNICE 1„ Kompetenzordnung und Handlungbefugnisse der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf 
dem Gebiet des Umwelt- und Technikrechts, Die Verwaltung 1989, 43. 
•• Cf. WOODROFFE G./WEATHERILL S„ Post Market Control ofTechnical Consumer Guuds in thc UK 
in MICKLITZ H.-W. (ed), Post Market Control (FN 31), 259 et seq. 
'
9 GESTEL M. C./SNIJDERS G. M. F„ Product Safety in Emergency Situations: The Netherlands (FN 
28). 
•° Cf. Council decision 84/133/EEC of 2.3.1984, O.J. L 70/16 et seq. of 13.3.1984. 
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II. FURTHER PROBLEMS FOR THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
OF PRODUCT SAFETY LA W 
The restructuring of product safety law creates a series of legal problems which sooncr or 
later must bc addrcsscd. Thc debatc focuscs upon the constituent principles of the organi-
sation of product safety law: the centrally designed opening up of the market and the de-
central, or possibly central enforcement of standards which are created at the centre. 
1. LEGAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM A CENTRAUSED OPENING OF THE MARKET 
The realisation of the Intemal Market is only possible if all markets are truly opened. The 
Single European Act is designed to achieve this goal. The Community, however, in its 
attempts to create the Intemal Market, becomes increasingly entangled in the regulation of 
product safety.•1 The underlying logic is comparatively simple: pharmaceuticals, food-
stuffs, technical consumer goods and chemicals pose, per sc, a health hazard. If the EEC 
wishes to secure a frec flow of trade in the Community by harmonising market entry 
conditions, it concurrently intervenes, or better still must intervene in product safety law. 
Steindorf}2 has recently questioncd the ability of the Community to pursue an 11 active 
and positive creation of social policies" and asked whether the Community should not 
restrict itself to those 11 connected social policies11 , inextricably linked to the opening of the 
market. This relates to jurisdiction. A centralised crcation of standards would, given this 
pcrspective, only thcn be legitimate if it were aimed at the opening of the market. Accor-
ding to this, the proposed product safety directive does not fall within the competences of 
the Community. Even more complex, when seen in this light, would be the attempts of the 
Commission to harmonise, or even centralises legal enforcement. This process, so it is 
argued, ensures by the harmonisation of post-market control, that markets arc not retros-
pcctively closed by divergent decision-making.•• This does not rclate to the opcning of 
markets, but to the maintenance of open markcts. lt is exactly this type of post-market 
control which is most important in product safety policies.6• Norbert Reich•• considers thc 
distinction between 11 original social policies 11 and 11 anncxed social policies 11 to be irrelevant 
as it is bascd on too restricted a concept of the Internal Market. Product safety, whether as 
an 
11
indcpendent11 policy or an 11 annex" is part of thc Internal Markct. Such a concept of 
the Interna! Market, containing socio-political elements, avoids thc dichotomy identificd by 
Steindorf[. As a consequence Reich must place the regulation of product safety within thc 
ambit of Article lOOa, as anchoring it to Articlc 130r would, on thc contrary, establish thc 
•
1 
Cf. to this MICKLITZ H.-W., Consumer Rights in CASSESE A./CLAPHAM A./WEILER J. H. H., 
(cds), Human Rights and lhe European Communily: Thc Substantive Law, 1991 (forthcoming), 53 cl 
scq. Commenls by PIPKORN J., 113 et seq. 
62 Grenzen der EG-Kompetenz, Heidelberg 1990, 32. 
63 We pursued this theory in our study, JOERGES C. et al. (FN 2). 
64 
Cf. MICKLITZ H.-W. (ed), Post Markct Control of Consumer Goods (FN 31). 
65 REICH N., Binnenmarkt als Rechtsbegriff, EuZW 1991, 203 et seq. 
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competence of the Member States. He therefore adheres to the doctrine which places 
product safety under Article lOOa and procedural regulation under Article 130r.•• 
This interprctation leads Reich to take the step, explicitly laid down in Article 130r of 
the Single European Act; that is a movement away from a purely business oriented 
concept of the Internal Market.67 Article 130r requires a re-orientation of the Internal 
Market. There is, however, no corollary to Article 130r in consumer protection policy. 
Whilst the Council has proclaimed that consumer protection and product safety are to be 
integrated into the other policies,68 there is no explicit mention of consumer protection in 
the Single European Act. A socio-political concept of the Internal Market gives the samc 
result. Article lOOa rubs shoulders with Article 130r. Added legal validity may be glca-
ned from thc case law of the ECJ, which has declared the "Consumer Protection Pro-
gramme" to have legal effect.•• 
Where a socio-political conccpt of the Internal Market is applied, Article IOOa must 
bc understood as a competence-detailing provision. Kai Hailbronner regards Article IOOa 
as a mere procedural norm,'0 given substance by Articlc 130r. A noteworthy position is 
takcn by Verloren van Themat who considers the Commission's proposed product safety 
directive to be ultra vires as the Single European Act has not altered the jurisdictional 
boundaries.71 The final conclusion would be the inability of the Commission and the Com-
munity to introduce product safety policies under Article IOOa; if this is to be clone at all 
it must be under Article 235.n We would take a different approach. Discussion in Germa-
ny is primarily concerned with the division of competences." Who has the power to inclu-
dc social policies within the realisation of the Internal Market: mercly the Membcr States 
or also the Community? W e would go further and state that this is not merely a qucstion of 
power, but also of "the acceptance ofresponsibility". Two paths are open: if Articlc lOOa 
is a competcncc detailing provision, thcn the Community must take responsibilty for the 
hcalth and safcty of citizens throughout the EEC. lf this path is not chosen onc is lcft with 
a "tranference of duties" in the sense of dclegation. This entails the rccognition by the 
Member States of their responsibilitics and the tranference of these, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to the Community within measures for the realisation of the Intcrnal Market. If 
66 Cf. an overview of the state the discussion in JOERGES C./FALKE J. (FN 2); cf. especially HAIL-
BRONNER K., Der "nationale Alleingang" im Gemeinschaftsrecht am Beispiel der Augasstandards für 
PKW, EuGRZ 1989, 101 et seq.; SCHEUING D. H., Umweltschutz auf der Grundbge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Akte, EuR 1989, 152 et seq. 
67 Cf. similarly in relation to this HAILBRONNER K. (FN 66), 114. 
6
• 0.J. C 3, 15.12.1986, l et seq. 
69 ECJ of 7.3.1990, Case N° 362/88, not yct published in English, in German in EuZW 1990, 222 et 
seq. 
10 Cf. FN 66, 105/106. 
71 Cf. some comments of a formcr advocate gcneral at the Court of Justice of the EEC in FALLON 
M./MANIET F. (eds) (FN 25), 129 et seq.; STEINDORFF E. (FN 65), is forced to the same conclu-
sion~ 
72 There is increased conOict between the Commission, Council and Parliamcnl over the appropriatc legal 
basis. To this PERNICE 1. (FN 57), l et scq., who gives an ovcrview. 
73 lt is apparent that competences are not the subject of such vehement discussion in the othcr Memuer 
States. Cf. an ovcrview in LAENERTS K. (FN 17), 223. 
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one pursues lhis path further, the consequences prove far more troublesome; namely with 
the delegation of duties related to the completion of the Interna! Market to the Communi-
ly, responsibility for action also passes to the Community. lt must be decided at the outset 
whether Article lOOa is a competence-detailing or a simple proccdural norm. lt is a fact 
that the Community in its attempts to realise the Interna! Market has entangled itself in the 
regulation of product safety. lt must then take the health and safety of the public into ac-
count. lt is impossible, and in this Reich is correct, to uncouple product safety from the 
Interna! Market. The regulation of product safety and the realisation of the Interna! Mar-
ket are inextricably linked.1• To distinguish between the competence norm or the procedu-
ral norm leads to error, as the final question remains whether the Member States can 
claim any residual competence in areas covered by Community action. 
The relevance of such a line of investigation becomes apparent in cases of conflict, 
more precisely, what happens when the Community fully harmoniscs an area, on the basis 
of Article lOOa, but the levels of protection which it establishes are lower than those of a 
Member State overruled during the voting procedure? The problem is no longer theoreti-
cal, as it was in the debate on German petrol emission standards,70 where, with hindsight 
the protests of the Federal Government went off like a damp squib. The Community wants 
to implement a common "conformity mark" for the marketing of technical consumer 
goods. In the opinion of the Commission the German safety mark, the GS (Geprüfte Si-
cherheit) is not compatible with this.7• Another example of even greater importance: the 
Federal Republic of Germany, under great pressure from the public, has completely ban-
ned the marketing of pentachlorphenol." The Community did not introducc a ban and 
allowed marketing to continue, only reducing the permitted concentration levels. Can the 
Federal Republic of Germany maintain its higher standards (CS-Zeichen) and/or introduce 
a complete ban in reliance on Article lOOa para. 4?78 
1. OPTION 
The everything or nothing solution: the Commission has, with the adoption of the proposed 
measures, taken the regulation of product safety onto its own shoulders. Article 36, in the 
sense given to it by the ECJ,79 points to this approach. Article 36 is not to be understood 
as a compctence-detailing norm. On the contrary, the Member States may maintain mea-
sures for the protection of health and safety only if they are legitimate and not hidden 
protectionism mechanisms. Legitimate national measures can only be standardised 
through harmonisation. With harmonisation, however, the Member States lose the right to 
" EVERLING N. may also be interpreted in this way (FN 54), 204/205. 
1
• Cf. comprehensively, HAILBRONNER K. (FN 66}. 
,. Cf. Global Concept (FN 9). 
11 BGBl. 1989 I 2235 et seq. 
71 Cf. for a discussion on the importance of Art. l OOa para. 4, ZU LEEG M., Vorbehaltene Kompetenzen 
der Mitgliedstaaten, NVwZ 1987, 279 et seq.; HAILBRONNER K. (FN 66); SCHEUING E. U. (FN 
66). 
79 Corroboration to be found in LAENERTS K. (FN 17), 221 et seq. 
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set their own product safety goals. Article 36 is not watertight, as Article lOOa para. 4 
allows the Member States to diverge from majority decisions of the Community. The emer-
gent German position sees in Article lOOa para. 4 the right of a nation to follow its own 
path.•• If one does not take this position, and much remains speculation, the importance of 
Article lOOa para. 3 in the context of product safety policies becomes decisive. Is it a 
simple "operational instruction"" or on the contrary a "legal rule"? What is the meaning 
of a "high level of protection"? Does Community law have a basic standard that the public 
be afforded the "best possible protection" from product risks.82 Such a ground rule could 
compensate for the lack of competence of the Member States, which arises when a narrow 
interpretation is given to Article lOOa para. 4. Article lOOa para. 3 must then, however, 
be regarded as a legal rule which the Parliament safeguards.•• The case law of the ECJ 
would not disagree with this approach as Article lOOa para. 3 would, in this context, also 
be considered a procedural norm. A failure to observe this norm would infringe the rights 
of Parliament.•• The institutional balance, both vertically and horizontally, would in any 
case support an increase in the competences of Parliament. 
2. OPTION· TIIE RE-DELEGATION SOLUTION 
This imputes that the Commission in its adoption of the planned directives in product safe-
ty, has accepted both competence and responsibility. Such a move would be in tune with 
the case law of the ECJ. The planned measures for the organisation of product safety law, 
however, show that the Commission is not (any langer) able to fulfill all its tasks. lt has to 
redelegate competenccs to the Member States. This move is obvious in standardisation 
and even clearer in certification. The Commission wants to entrust the first stage evalua-
tion of the risk to the Member States, who should perform this function "in the name of 
the Community". The action of the Commission is undoubtedly wise politically and in 
view of the optimal use of the aggregate resources of the Member States is also practical. 
But is it legally legitimate? The re-delegation of competences waters down the pre-emption 
doctrine.•• The ECJ appears prepared to accept this conclusion in the Common Commer-
cial Policy.•• Whether this case law is applicable to the completion of the Interna! Market, 
•• Cf. ground-breaking ZULEEG M. (FN 78) and HAILBRONNER K. (FN 66). 
81 Cf. ZULEEG M. (FN 78), 284. 
82 ZULEEG M. (FN 78), has attempted just this in the area of environmental protection. Article l 30r pro-
vides the starting point, but this is lacking in product safety. 
" This argument is made by KRÄMER L„ Grundrecht auf Umweltschutz, EuGRZ 1988, 285 et scq„ 
289; also PERNICE 1. (FN 57), 9. 
•• Cf. ECR, 1990, 269 et seq„ to this HILF M„ Das Klagerecht des Europäischen Parlaments im Organs-
treit, EuR 1990, 273 et seq. 
85 Cf. DOMINIK M„ "EEC-Israel Agreement and the Common Commercial Poiicy", ELR 1986, 466 et 
seq„ 470. 
" Cf. to this discussion, WALBROECK M„ The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption • Consent 
and Re-Delegation in SANDELOW T./STEIN E„ (eds), The Courts and the Free Markets; Perspectives 
from the United States and Europe, 1982, 584 et seq.; LAENERTS K. (FN 17), 228; MICKLITZ H.-
W./REICH N„ Legal Aspects of European Space Activities, ZERP-Schriftenreihe Band 9, 1989, pts. 
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in particular to the relationship between Articles 30/36 and 100a!7 is, however open to 
debate. Re-delegation would allow Member States to challenge the "acquis communautai-
re". Is the Community now so strongly "federalist", that it could make political use of this 
Jever, developed by the ECJ, in the Council - and not in a fully fledged democratic parlia-
ment?•• 
3. OPTION - SllARED COMPETENCES ßETWEEN TIIE COMMUt\ITY 
AND TllE MEMBER STATES? 
The starting point here is a certain scepticism as to whether the annexed regulation of 
product safety within the Interna! Market programmc has really lead to a delegation of all 
the competences and responsibilities of the Member States, within the field of product 
safety, to the Community. Questions may arise which cannot be answered by EEC regula-
tion. Whether this is or must be related to independent policies not linked to the Interna! 
Market Programme, seems to us difficult of definition. Shared responsibilities should not 
be linked to a perception of product safety which exists "outside" the Interna! Market -
that is a conception of product safety which transcends the Interna! Market. Such a diffe-
rcntiation would soon be lost in borderline cases. lt is also academic insofar as national 
product safety law is integrated in national markets. lt seems more important to us to ask 
whether therc is a residual national competence which can assert itself above the exclusive 
claim of Community law. 
Community law contrary to federal constitutions knows no shared competences and 
responsibilities. Thc case law of the ECJ states that where the Community becomes activc 
it automatically inherits competence. This conccpt does not answer the difficulties of a 
dclegation and redelegation of competences. On thc other hand it should not be over-
lookcd that the concept of shared rcsponsibility also places the pre-emption doctrine in 
doubt and thus causes problems for the foundations of Community law .'9 
lt may bc possiblc and fruitful to scck a basic norm for the minimum character of 
markct entry regulation in Community law. This is laid down explicitly for environmental 
protcction in Article l 30t and for social policies in Article l 18a. The proportionality prin-
ciple may provide a starting point, in any case this will be so when it is applied to the rela-
tionship between thc Community and the Member States.9• lt seems to us, however, that 
thc proportionality principle is not alone a sufficient base for such a basic principle. Thc 
94, 114 et seq. 
81 To the legal cffccts of the "New Approach", LAUWAARS R„ The Model Dircctivc on Technical Har· 
monization in ßlEilER R./DEHOUSSE R./PINDER J./WEILER J. H. H. (eds), 1992: One European 
Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission's market strategy, Baden-Baden 1988, 151 et seq., 165. 
" Cf. LAENERTS K. (FN 17), 259. 
89 To this point sce discussions upon cnvironmental and technology law in the Europcan Community · 
Antrieb oder Hemmnis, 4. Trierer Kolloqium zum Umwelt· und Technikrecht vom 21. bis 23. Septem· 
ber 1988, Düsseldorf 1989, 165 et scq. 
9° Cf. with examples from case law, REICH N. (FN 65), who, however, rcjccts the crcation of a subsidiari· 
ly rule. 
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foundation must be sought in the desired institutional balance between Member States and 
the central organ in a federal constitution.•1 This would secure against the <langer that the 
Member State with the lowest Standards dictates the tempo of the convoy. If, however, a 
divergence from the harmonised entry conditions is not only tolerated, but also desired, 
then a mechanism is needed to secure the constant revision of the harmonised standards 
and their adaptation to higher "natural" standards. The Community and remaining Mem-
ber States could take on board an "improvement duty 11 • This would a least ensure the 
possibility of a revision of standards once they have been set and harmonised. If Article 
lOOa para. 4 secures the right to "go it alone" in pursuit of an improvement in product 
safety within the Community, then this provision offers the basic foundation stone on 
which the co-operation duty between the State with higher standards and the Community 
and remaining States may be built. In the final analysis this requires the devclopment of a 
procedure•• which ensures a constant improvement and at the same time impedes each 
Member State from finding its own path instead of encouraging them to remain true to the 
search for a worthwhile common European standard. 
2. LEGAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM DECE!ffRAUSED OR CENTRAUSED ENFORCEMENT 
The Commission still follows two paths but with one evcr stronger motif. Two approaches 
remain: on the one hand the management of normal risk by the Member States, on the 
other, the management of increased risk situations by the Community. Ilut the tendency 
appears to be towards centralistion. 
A decentralise enforcement can only avoid the <langer of closure of markets if the de-
centralised authorities are required to observe each others decisions. The Federal Consti-
tutional Court has declared this to be thc case for German lndustry Supervisory Authori-
tics" (Gewerbeaufsichtsämter). This decision corresponds to the doctrine of mutual 
recognition. The Commission has, however, given up its attempts to achieve harmonisation 
oflaw enforcement by promoting mutual recognition.•• Where the Commission feels that it 
can live with divcrsity it entrusts the developmcnt of co-ordination and co-operation to the 
Member States; on the other band, where a common decision is required, i.e. in the eva-
luation of emergency situations and cases of increased risk, it desires centralised decision-
making. Primary Community law perhaps provides more chances for the realisation of 
mutual recognition than the Commission now accepts. Much has been written on the im-
portance of Article lOOb.•• lt is nevertheless impossible to predict the restrictions which 
the ECJ will place on this Article. 
91 Cf. MOIT R. N., Federal State Regulations in U.S. Environmental Law: lmplications for the European 
Community, EPU No 90/2. 
'" Cf. REICH N. (FN 65), comcs to this conclusion and uses this argument to combat the Compctences 
discussion. 
•• Cf. BVerfGE 11, l et seq., 6. 
•• This is explicit in the area of pharmaceutica\s where the Member States are clearly addresscd in thcse 
terms; this is not the case for ccrtification. The conditions are not, however, comparable. 
95 Cf. EHLERMANN C. D., The internal market following the Single Act, CMLR 1987, 361 et seq.; 
68 - HANS-W. MICKIJTZ 
The EEC Treaty only recognises a centralised enforcement competence in competi-
tion law. Can the Member States use secondary Community law to transfer enough com-
petences to the Community to give it full enforcement authority?•• Or is the Commission, 
once again acting ultra vires? The core of the committee proposals is the formal retention 
of power by the Member States. But an increasing tendency is apparent, especially in the 
management of emergency situations, to restrict the operational room of the Member Sta-
tes. This could lead to a de facto centralisation of decision-making in the hands of the 
Commission. 
Protests are made about the Europeanisation of management, both in its centralised 
and in its decentralised form, where it creates an almost autarkical system, which is no 
langer subject to legal control. This is situated outside the sphere of national law, but not 
yet within the ambit of Community law. At the present the committees are not even sub-
ject to reporting duties, and even should such a duty arise, reports are often late or not 
completed. The composition of the working groups, both the scientific-technical and the 
political-administrative committees, is not transparent. If procedural rules ex.ist at all, they 
are not made public. The continuing discussion on the democratisation of administration 
within the westem industrial world apparent since the l 970s has fallen victim to the inte-
gration process. The committees have fumished the administrations of the Member States 
with a niche into which they may withdraw and direct product safety policies without fear 
of legal interference. The question should, however, be addressed. Must the committees 
be subject to democratic control, does existing Community law demand a reporting duty 
and transparency? Finally the composition of the working groups is called into question. 
Consumers are active on the technical-scientific level in the areas of standardisation and 
certification. Here they are used to legitimise the privatisation of product safety. Should 
they also be represented on the reconstituted Pharmaceutical Specialities Committee?•1 
A centralisation of the decision-making process in the hands of the Commission re-
quires one to identify the degree of legal protection given to any affected undertaking. 
The proposed model already gives the Commission sole discretion as to when it accepts 
the majority decision of the scientific-technical committee. The proposed regulation for 
the creation of a Medicinal Products Authority plans to give producers a direct action 
against the Commission." Product safety should be regulated by means of a directive and 
not a regulation. The same is true for decision making in emergency situations. Whilst 
Member States are bound to observe the decision of the Commission, legal protection for 
national actors must be guaranteed bcfore national courts. Should not a way be found to 
MATTHIES H., Zur Anerkennung gleichwertiger Regelungen im Binnenmark.t der EG (Art. lOOb 
EWG-Vertrag) in Festschrift E. Steindorff, Berlin 1990, 1287 et seq.; EVERLING U., Probleme der 
Rechtsangleichung zur Verwirklichung des europäischen Binnenmarktes in Festschrift E. Steindorff, 
Berlin 1990, 1155 et seq. 
•• Comprehensively to this problem, HILF M., Die Organisationsstruktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 
Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1982, 310 et seq. 
97 Cf. HART D./REICH N. (FN 22). 
" Cf .. HART D./RE!CH N. (FN 22). This would also create a new precedent, that is the release of a regu· 
lat1on under Art. l OOa. 
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enable undertakings thus affected to challenge Commission decisions in the ECJ, even if 
they have been implemented by the Member States, especially as the actions of the Mem-
ber States are mere interpretations of Community decisions? 
111. CONCLUSION 
The discussion an the legal questions of organisational structures demonstrates the organi-
sational difficulty of integrating product safety within Community policies. Despite an 
inventive richness it appears that the present structures are not adequate to allow a reali-
sation of lhe Interna! Market. The Intemal Market, achievable only at the cost of an inte-
grated product safety policy, requires a re-assessment of organisational principles. The 
discussion an lhe organisation of product safety regulation is inextricably linked with the 
revision of the European economic constitution. 
